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ABSTRACT
Theoretically, executive stock options align managers’ and shareholders’ interests. However, 
previous studies have indicated that stock options may engender manager-shareholder 
conﬂicts (Jensen, 2005) and create incentives for earnings management (e.g. Jensen, Murphy 
and Wruck, 2004; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson, 2007). Therefore, 
this paper examines the implications of stock option grants on earnings management. In 
particular, we address the following question: Does stock options grant induce incentives for 
earnings management? Using a sample of 33 non-ﬁnancial listed Portuguese ﬁrms-year from 
2003 to 2010, we ﬁnd that managers are more likely to engage in earnings management when 
they hold stock options. This study suggests that stock options may not always be effective in 
aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. Rather, executive stock options seem to 
affect the informational quality of earnings negatively, and consequently reduce the quality 
and value relevance of published ﬁnancial data.
KEYWORDS: stock options, earnings management, discretionary accruals.
JEL Classiﬁcation: M410, G32, G34
RESUMEN
Teóricamente, las opciones sobre acciones para ejecutivos permiten alinear los intereses de la 
dirección con los de los accionistas. No obstante, los estudios anteriores han indicado que las 
opciones sobre acciones pueden provocar conﬂictos de intereses entre ejecutivos y accionistas 
(Jensen, 2005) y crear incentivos para la gestión de resultados (e.g. Jensen et al., 2004; Burns 
and Kedia, 2006; Efendi et. al., 2007). Así, este trabajo examina las implicaciones de la 
atribución de opciones sobre acciones en la gestión de resultados. En particular, planteamos 
la siguiente pregunta: ¿La atribución de opciones sobre acciones induce la práctica de gestión 
de resultados? Utilizando una muestra de 33 empresas portuguesas no ﬁnancieras cotizadas 
para el período 2003-2010, observamos que los ejecutivos son más propensos a la adopción de 
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prácticas de gestión de resultados cuando poseen opciones sobre acciones. Consecuentemente, 
este estudio sugiere que las opciones sobre acciones no siempre eﬁcaces para alinear los 
intereses de los ejecutivos con los de los propietarios de la compañía. De facto, las opciones 
sobre acciones parecen afectar negativamente la calidad de los resultados y, consecuentemente 
reducen la calidad y relevancia de los estados ﬁnancieros publicados.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Opciones sobre acciones, Gestión de Resultados, Devengo 
Discrecionales.
Clasiﬁcación JEL: M410, G32, G34
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INTRODUCTION 
Agency theory suggests that the monitoring mechanisms can improve the alignment of 
management and shareholders’ interests and mitigate any opportunistic behaviour resulting 
from conﬂict of interests. 
A mechanism that can potentially be used to minimize agency problems consists of integrating 
incentives in managers’ remuneration packages. Aimed at aligning the interests of executives 
with those of the shareholders, stock options have become a popular component of managerial 
compensation packages. Stock options provide incentives for executives to take actions that 
increase share prices and consequently shareholders wealth. Theoretically, this would improve 
the alignment of management and shareholders’ interests and therefore reduce agency costs, 
since stock options provide a direct link between executive utility level and shareholder 
wealth. Actually, aligning managers’ interests with those of the shareholders is on of the most 
often cited reasons for seeking shareholders’ approval for the executive stock option grant (see, 
e.g. EDP annual report 2003-2010; Brisa annual report 2003-2010).
However, previous empirical studies reveal that managerial equity compensation is positively 
related to the extent of earning manipulation (Cheng and Warﬁeld, 2005; Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006). In fact, while executive stock options align managers’ interest with those 
of the shareholders, they may also have some dysfunctional effects (Hall and Murphy, 2002, 
2003; Meulbroek, 2001). In practice, stock options may produce manager-shareholder conﬂicts 
(Jensen, 2005) and induce executives to engage in earnings management (e.g. Jensen, Murphy 
and Wruck, 2004; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson, 2007). Really, 
managers may choose accounting methods in self-interested attempts to manage stock prices 
to maximize the value of stock options they hold (Fields, Thomas and Vincent, 2001). For 
example, Yermack (1997) hypothesises that managers inﬂuence their compensation contracts 
to include more option awards preceding the release of good news. Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
investigate whether chief executive ofﬁcers (CEOs) manage the timing of their voluntary 
disclosures around stock options awards. They results suggest that CEOs make opportunistic 
voluntary disclosure decisions that maximize their stock option compensation.
As reported earnings may affect stock price movement, one way managers can inﬂuence the 
stock price of the ﬁrm is to manipulate reported earnings (Subramanyam, 1996; Zhang et al., 
2008). Therefore, stock options compensation encourages earnings management. For example, 
Balsam, Chen and Sankaraguruswamy (2003) ﬁnd that managers use earning management 
to decrease the market price prior to stock option grants. Bartov and Mohanram (2004) ﬁnd 
that managers inﬂate earnings, through accruals management, prior to large stock options 
1
214 Sandra Alves
RC-SAR  ISSN: 1138-4891  Vol. 15.2  Julio-Diciembre 2012  Pág. 211-235
exercises. Cornett, Marcus and Tehraniam (2008) document that stock options compensation 
encourages earnings management.
In this study, we examine the effect of stock options on a ﬁrm’s earnings management activity. 
Using a sample of 33 Euronext Lisbon non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms over a period of 8 years, from 
2003 through 2010, we ﬁnd evidence that managers are more likely to engage in earnings 
management when they hold stock options. As in Alves (2011) this study suggests that stock 
options may not always be effective in aligning the interests of CEOs and shareholders. Rather, 
they seem encourage CEOs engage in earnings manipulation. 
The study makes some contributions to the existing literature. The study contributes to the 
earnings management literature: it investigates whether managers manipulate earnings when 
stock options are part of their compensation. This study also contributes to the management 
compensation literature: it evaluates stock options, a component of management compensation, 
as a potential incentive for earnings management. Therefore, this study contributes to 
the literature by showing the effect of executive stock options on earnings management. 
This is important because, there is limited knowledge on the implications of stock options 
compensation on managerial behaviour, especially in Portugal. Thus, this paper adds to the 
literature by being the ﬁrst to provide empirical evidence on this issue in Portugal. In fact, 
although stock options have been used in a wide range of countries, mainly in the US and the 
UK, only recently have they become a component of managerial compensation in Portugal. 
The Portuguese market presents a unique case in the study of the determinants of executive 
stock options, because, it has a very different corporate governance structure, characterized 
by concentrated ﬁrm ownership and a strong bank presence. This feature can inﬂuence the 
earnings management activity. As the stock price rises, the stock options become more valuable 
to the managers. Higher earnings often imply higher stock returns. So, there is an incentive for 
managers to manipulate earnings and an information asymmetry problem is created by offering 
unreliable and irrelevant ﬁnancial statements. This scenario creates agency costs and leads to 
opportunistic management behavior. 
The ﬁndings of this study should be of interest to regulators and investors, which are concerned 
about earnings management and improving the quality of ﬁnancial reporting. They also will be 
important to boards of directors contemplating compensation contracts for executives.
This paper is structured as follows. In section two, we provide an overview of the literature 
review and develop testable hypotheses. We present the variable measurement and describe 
the research methodology in section three. The sample selection process and characteristics 
of the sample are presented in section four. The results are reported and discussed in section 
ﬁve. We provide sensitivity tests in section six. Finally, section seven concludes the study. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES
Stock options are one form of compensation which ﬁrms utilize to reward top management 
and align their interests with those of the ﬁrm. Actually, stock options provide incentives for 
executives to take actions that increase share prices and consequently shareholders wealth. 
However, those interests may not always be in line and even it they are, the executive may 
not always use appropriate means to improve ﬁrm performance. In fact, managers may act in 
own interests in their response to the economic incentives in compensation contracts (Baiman, 
1990). As the stock price rises, the stock options become more valuable to the managers. 
Higher earnings often imply higher stock returns. Therefore, stock options also give executives 
an incentive to manage earnings. 
Considerable research have examined whether executive stock options help in aligning 
incentives. For example, Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin (2003), using US data, examine the 
relation between stock options grants to the top ﬁve executives and the future earnings, and 
they ﬁnd that a dollar of the value of an option grant is associated with future operating income 
over the next ﬁve years of approximately $3.71. Conyon and Freeman (2002), using UK data, 
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship between stock options and ﬁrm level productivity. For 
a sample of Japanese ﬁrms, Kato, Lemmon and Schallheim (2005) study the impact of stock 
options on ﬁrms’ operating performance. They ﬁnd that the post-grant operating performance 
of the adopting ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly higher compared to ﬁrms that do not grant stock options. 
These studies suggest that stock options help in aligning incentives. In contrast, Kanagaretnam, 
Mathieu and Ramanan (2009), using US data, document a negative relationship between stock 
option and contemporaneous operating performance. Finally, Melle-Hernández (2005) and 
Alves (2011) also ﬁnd a negative relationship between stock options and ﬁrm performance for 
a sample of Spanish ﬁrms and a sample of Portuguese ﬁrms, respectively.
Other studies have examined whether stock options induce opportunistic managerial behaviour. 
In the United States, for example, Baker, Collins and Reitenga (2003) and Balsam, Chen and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrms make income-decreasing accruals prior to stock option 
grants. Cheng and Warﬁeld (2005) document that managers with high equity incentives (stock 
ownership and stock options) are more likely to engage in earnings management and reporting 
earnings that meet or beet analysts’ forecasts. Coles, Hertzel and Kalpathy (2006) examine 
earnings management around the cancellation and subsequent reissue of executive stock 
options. They ﬁnd strong evidence of abnormally low accruals leading up to the option reissue 
date. Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) study the relation between earnings manipulation and 
CEO equity-based incentives. They ﬁnd that the use of discretionary accruals to manipulate 
reported earnings is more pronounced at ﬁrms where the CEO’s potential total compensation 
is more closely tied to the value of stock and option holdings. Zhang et al. (2008) examine the 
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effects of stock-based incentives on CEO earnings manipulation behaviours. With respect to 
the effect of stock options on earnings management, the results show that the larger the amount 
of out-of-money options, the more likely CEOs are to engage in earnings manipulation.
In Europe, Kuang (2008) using UK data, studies the effects of performance-vested stock 
options on the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management. Results suggest 
that greater performance-vested stock options holdings are associated with higher levels of 
abnormal accruals, which implies that managers are more active in managing earnings when 
they hold a greater part of their compensation in performance-vested stock options. 
Summing up, recent studies suggest that stock options motivate executives to manipulate 
earnings. In this study we examine whether executives, when stock options are part of their 
compensation, manipulate earnings by using discretionary accruals. Therefore, our hypothesis, 
in alternative form, is:
H1: Executive stock options are positively related to earnings management
VARIABLE MEASUREMENT AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. Measuring stock options
Stock options variable taking the value of 1 if the managers of ﬁrm i hold stock options 
for period t, and 0 otherwise. We use a binary variable, because for the period of analysis 
there is not information available allowing to measure the value of the stock options hold by 
managers. 
3.2. Measuring earnings management
Following standard accounting literature, we use discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management. Discretionary accruals are estimated using both the cross sectional variation 
of the Jones model (1991) and the cross sectional variation of the modiﬁed Jones model 
proposed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), that are commonly used by most of earnings 
management research (Caneghem, 2002; Jaggi and Leung, 2007; Klein, 2002; Koh, 2003; Liu 
and Lu, 2007). Furthermore, recently some researchers have argued that current discretionary 
accruals are the most powerful models for estimating discretionary accruals among the existing 
models (Guay, Kothari and Watts, 1996; Ashbaugh, LaFond and Mayhew, 2003; Jaggi and 
Leung, 2007). 
3
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The Jones’ model consists of regressing total accruals (TACC) on two variables: the change 
in revenues (ǻRev), which models the normal component of working capital accruals; and 
the level of gross property, plant and equipment (PPE), included to control for the non-
discretionary component of depreciation and amortisation expense, the main component of 
long-term accruals. Both variables and the intercept are divided by lagged total assets in order 
to avoid problems of heteroskedasticity. Non-discretionary accruals (NDACC_Jones) are the 
predictions from the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of model (1), while discretionary 
accruals (DACC_Jones) are the residuals.
The speciﬁc Jones model is as follows:
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Where,
TACC = total accruals in year t, calculated as the difference between net income and operating 
cash ﬂows.
TA = total assets at the beginning of year t.
Rev = change in revenues.
PPE = gross property, plant and equipment.
i,t = ﬁrm and year index.
The modiﬁed Jones model differs from the original Jones model in that the change in revenues is 
adjusted for the change in receivables (Rec). Non-discretionary accruals (NDACC_ModJones) 
are the predictions from the OLS estimation of model (2), while discretionary accruals (DACC_
ModJones) are the residuals. 
The modiﬁed Jones model is as follows:
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Where,
TACC; TA; Rev; PPE; i,t = as deﬁned previously. 
Rec = change in accounts receivable.
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3.3. Regression model and control variables
Given that the stock options are not the sole factors affecting earnings management, several 
control variables are introduced to isolate other contracting incentives that may be inﬂuence 
managers’ accounting choices. Previous research suggests that board size, independent 
board, nonduality, board meetings, cash ﬂows, leverage, net operating assets, performance, 
investment opportunities, ﬁrm size, ownership concentration and international ﬁnancial 
reporting standards (IFRS) are associated with earnings management (e.g. Ali, Salleh and 
Hassan, 2008; Barton and Simko, 2002; Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008; Chen, Cheng and 
Wang, 2010; Chung, Firth and Kim, 2002; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo, 1994; DeFond and Park, 1997; Klein, 2002; Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005; 
Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2005; Xie, Davidson and DaDalt, 2003; Yang, Lai and Tan, 2008). 
We evaluate the association between stock options and earnings management by estimating 
the following OLS regression: 
DACC
it
 = + (Stock Options
it
) + (Board Size
it
) + (Independent Board
it
) + 
(Nonduality
it
) + (Meetings
it
) + (Cash ﬂows
it
) + (Leverage
it
) + (Net 
Operating Assets
it
) + (Performance
it
)+ (Investment Opportunities
it
) 
 + (Firm Size
it
) + (Firm Size 2
it
) + (Concentration
it
) +  (IFRS
it
) + 
it
  [3]
Where:
DACC
it
 = earnings management of ﬁrm i for period t by using two different proxies for earnings 
management: Jones model and the modiﬁed Jones model. 
Stock Options
it 
= dummy variable: 1 if the managers of ﬁrm i hold stock options for period t, 
and 0 otherwise.
Board Size
it
 = number of members on the board of ﬁrm i for period t. 
Independent Board
it
 = ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number 
of board members of ﬁrm i for period t. 
Nonduality
it 
= dummy variable: 1 when ﬁrm’s CEO and board chair is not the same person and 
0 otherwise.
Meetings
it
 = annual number of board meetings of ﬁrm i for period t.
Cash ﬂows
it
 = ratio between the operating cash ﬂows and the total assets of ﬁrm i for period t-1.
Leverage
it
 = ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total assets of ﬁrm i for period t.
Net Operating Assets
it
 = following Barton and Simko (2002) we use the beginning balance of net 
operating assets relative to sales. Net operating assets are measured as shareholders’ 
equity less cash and marketable securities, plus total debt. 
Performance
it 
= as in Kothari, Leone and Wasly (2005) we measure performance as return on 
assets of ﬁrm i for period t. 
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Investment Opportunities
it 
= ratio between the market value of equity and the book value of equity. 
Firm Size
it
 = logarithm of market value of equity of ﬁrm i for period t. 
Firm Size 2
it
 = squared of the logarithm of market value of equity of ﬁrm i for period t. 
Concentration
it
 = proportion of stocks owned by shareholders who own at least 2% of the 
common stock of ﬁrm i for period t.
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)
it
 = a dummy variable that take the value 
of one if a ﬁrm uses IFRS, and zero otherwise.
H
it
 = residual term of ﬁrm i for period t.
E
0
is a constant, E
1 
to E
11
 are the coefﬁcients. 
Control variables explained
Board Size. The higher the number of members on the board; the greater the monitoring activity 
of management. If large boards enhance monitoring, they would be associated with less use of 
earnings management. In this vein, Chtourou, Bédard and Courteau (2001), Ebrahim (2007), 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) and Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) ﬁnd that larger 
boards are associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals. 
Independent Board. The higher the proportion of independent directors on the board; the 
greater the monitoring activity of management (Booth, Cornett and Tehranian, 2002). Therefore, 
earnings management would be less likely to occur in companies with boards having more 
independent directors. In this vein, Klein (2002), Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003), Peasnell, 
Pope and Young (2005; 2006), Ebrahim (2007) and Johari et al. (2008) ﬁnd a negative relation 
between board independence and abnormal accruals.
Nonduality. Agency theory suggests that CEO duality (i.e. the CEO also serves as chairman 
of the board) increases agency problems, because duality promotes CEO entrenchment by 
reducing board independence (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994; 
Rhoades, Rechner and Sundaramurthy, 2001). Since board independence can potentially 
be negatively inﬂuenced under the dual leadership structure, nonduality may limit earnings 
management. Therefore, agency theory predicts a negative relationship between nonduality 
and earnings management. Numerous studies support agency theory predictions (e.g. Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; Davidson et al., 2004). 
Meetings. Vafeas (1999) suggest that boards meeting frequency play an important resource 
in improving ﬁrm performance, and thus the effectiveness of a board. “A board that meets 
more often should be able to devote more time to issues such as earnings management” (Xie, 
Davidson and DaDalt, 2003, p. 300). Therefore, board meetings can help to improve the board 
effectiveness in monitoring ﬁnancial reporting, and thus have a monitoring role in constraining 
220 Sandra Alves
RC-SAR  ISSN: 1138-4891  Vol. 15.2  Julio-Diciembre 2012  Pág. 211-235
earnings management. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) ﬁnd that when boards meet more 
often, discretionary accruals are lower.
Cash Flow. Cash ﬂow may also be associated with discretionary accruals. Chen, Elder and 
Hsieh (2007), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) and 
Yang, Lai and Tan (2008) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with strong operating cash ﬂows have lower levels of 
discretionary accruals. 
Leverage. Empirical evidence suggests that managers of highly leveraged ﬁrms have strong 
incentives to use income increasing accruals to loosen the contractual debt-constraints (Ali, 
Salleh and Hassan, 2008; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Jiang, Lee and Anandarajan, 2008). 
However, high levered ﬁrms may be less able to practice earnings management because they 
are under close scrutiny of lenders. Chung, Firth and Kim (2002), Park and Shin (2004), 
Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) and Yang, Lai and Tan (2008) ﬁnd a negative relationship 
between leverage and earnings management.
Net Operating Assets. Because the balance sheet accumulates the effects of previous accounting 
choices, the level of net assets partly reﬂects the extent of previous earnings management (Barton 
and Simko, 2002). Therefore, Barton and Simko (2002) predict and ﬁnd that managers’ ability to 
optimistically bias earnings decreases with the extent to which net assets are already overstated.
Performance. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) 
suggest that discretionary accruals are inﬂuenced by a ﬁrm’s performance. 
Investment Opportunities. Smith and Watts (1992) suggest that as the investment opportunities 
increase, the observability of managers’ actions decreases. Therefore, managers of the ﬁrm 
with high investment opportunities are more difﬁcult to monitor due to the high degree of 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Gaver and Gaver, 1993, 1995; 
Smith and Watts, 1992). As a result, “ﬁrm’s investment opportunity set will affect managerial 
behavior and decision making” (Chen et al., 2010, p. 195). AlNajjar and Belkaoui (2001), Park 
and Shin (2004) and Chen, Cheng and Wang (2010) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher investment 
opportunities are more likely to engage in earnings management. 
Firm Size. According to the size hypothesis large ﬁrms may have incentives to reduce political 
costs by reducing reported earnings (Koh, 2003). Banderlipe (2009), Jiang, Lee and Anandarajan 
(2008) and Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms are associated with lower 
absolute discretionary accruals. Nevertheless, larger ﬁrms may have higher incentives to 
manage earnings, because they are subject to closer scrutiny by the investment banks and 
analyst community, leading them to adopt aggressive accounting policies (Chen, Elder and 
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Hsieh, 2007). Chen, Elder and Hsieh (2007), Chung, Firth and Kim (2002) and Yang, Lai and 
Tan (2008) ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms are associated with higher absolute discretionary accruals.
Firm Size2. Sloan (1996) ﬁnds evidence of a concave relation between ﬁrm size and total 
accruals. Thus, we also include Firm size2, to examine whether a size effect the relationship 
between stock options and earnings management.
Concentration. As the ownership in Portuguese listed ﬁrms is highly concentrated, we also 
include the ownership concentration variable to control for the potential effect of ownership 
concentration on earnings management. In fact, large shareholders are expected to monitor 
managerial behaviour actions effectively, which reduce the scope of managerial opportunism to 
engage in earnings management (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996). In this vein, Ali, Salleh and 
Hassan (2008) ﬁnd that ownership concentration reduces the managers’ discretionary behaviour. 
IFRS. Since 2005, almost all publicly listed companies in Europe are required to prepare 
ﬁnancial statements in accordance with IFRS (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002). This study 
sample covers the period from 2003 to 2010; hence, ﬁrms that reported in 2003 and 2004 
are considered pre-IFRS ﬁrms, whereas ﬁrms that reported in 2005 to 2010 are considered 
post-IFRS ﬁrms. IFRS has had a large effect on company measurement and reporting methods 
(Ball, Kothari and Robin, 2000). The previous studies support the argument that the relation 
between earnings management and corporate governance can be affected by the introduction 
of IFRS (e.g. Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008; Daske et al., 2008).
SAMPLE SELECTION AND CHARACTERISTICS
The initial sample includes all companies whose stocks are listed, in the main market, in 
Euronext Lisbon. A total of 50, 48, 51, 51, 51, 50, 49 and 52 companies were listed at the 
year end of 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively (402 ﬁrm-year 
observations in total). 
Foreign companies (30 in total) are excluded, because the differences in institutional 
environments. Companies not having shares listed in the previous year and companies whose 
shares were delisted in the following year are also excluded (66 in total). Companies (5 in 
total) with missing data are also excluded. Financial companies (37 in total) are excluded, 
too. As a result, the ﬁnal sample size is 33 non-ﬁnancial companies per year and, thus, 
264 observations in total. This reduced number of observations may inﬂuence some results. 
Nevertheless, this limitation is an immediate consequence of the small size of the Portuguese 
stock market.
4
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Information on stock options, board size, independent board, nonduality, annual number of 
board meetings, ownership concentration, operational cash ﬂows, cash, marketable securities, 
liabilities, total assets, revenues, sales, gross property, plant and equipment, receivables and 
net income are collected from the Annual Report and Corporate Governance Report. Both 
Annual Report and Corporate Governance Report are available on-line at <www.cmvm.pt>. 
We obtain stock price data from the Euronext Lisbon, which allows measuring the variable ﬁrm 
size and investment opportunities. 
Table 1 presents the sample descriptive statistics for the variables used in this research.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
(number of observations: 264; Period: 2003-2010)
Mean Median Min. Max.
DACC_Jones -0.052 -0.056 -0.254 0.143
DACC_ModJones -0.052 -0.056 -0.267 0.110
Stock options 0.170 0.000 0.000 1.000
Board size 8.219 7.000 3.000 23.000
Independent board 0.299 0.283 0.000 0.592
Nonduality 0.418 0.000 0.000 1.000
Meetings 20.700 14.000 4.000 58.000
Cash ﬂows 0.071 0.077 -0.199 0.309
Leverage 4.406 1.985 0.167 20.214
Net operating assets 1.762 1.073 0.961 1.973
Performance -0.012 0.018 -1.662 0.461
Investment opportunities 1.060 0.994 0.000 3.649
Firm Size 19.149 19.022 14.447 23.517
Concentration 0.695 0.735 0.163 0.735
IFRS 0.718 1.000 0.000 1.000
DACC represents discretionary accruals estimated from the original Jones (1991) and modiﬁed Jones (Dechow et al., 
1995) models; Stock options dummy variable which takes a value 1 if the managers of ﬁrm i hold stock options for 
period t, and 0 otherwise; Board size is the number of members of the board; Independent board represents the ratio 
between the number of independent directors and the total number of board members; Nonduality dummy variable 
which takes a value 1 when ﬁrm’s CEO and board chair is not the same person and 0 otherwise; Meetings represents 
the annual number of board meetings; Cash ﬂows is the ratio between the operating cash ﬂows and the total assets; 
Leverage represents the ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total assets; Net Operating Assets 
represents the net operating assets relative to sales; Performance is the ﬁrm’s performance; Investment opportunities 
represents the ratio between the market value of equity and the book value of equity; Firm size represents the ﬁrm’s 
size; Concentration represents the proportion of stocks owned by shareholders who own at least 2% of the common 
stock; IFRS dummy variable which takes a value 1 if the ﬁrm uses IFRS, and 0 otherwise.
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35TABLE 2. PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS MATRIX
Board size
Independent 
board
Nonduality Meetings Cash ﬂows Leverage
Net 
operating
assets
Performance
Investment 
opportunities
Firm 
size
Concentration
Board size 1
Independent 
board
-0,053 1
Nonduality 0,406*** 0,135** 1
Meetings 0,337*** 0,134** 0,346*** 1
Cash ﬂows 0,227** 0,096 0,303*** 0,262*** 1
Leverage -0,324** 0,033 0,066 0,022 -0,301** 1
Net operating 
assets
0,065 0,087 0,009 0,189*** 0,247** -0,212** 1
Performance -0,052 0,013 -0,051 0,145** 0,043 -0,091 0,123** 1
Investment 
opportunities
0,144** -0,008 -0,009 0,135** 0,271*** -0,135 -0,087 -0,070 1
Firm size 0,605*** 0,179*** 0,433*** 0,442*** 0,376*** -0,596** 0,266*** 0,208*** 0,003 1
Concentration -0,101 -0,077 0,107** 0,080 0,117 0,002 0,163** 0,084 -0,167** -0,042 1
Board size is the number of members of the board; Independent board represents the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of board members; 
Nonduality dummy variable which takes a value 1 when ﬁrm’s CEO and board chair is not the same person and 0 otherwise; Meetings represents the annual number of board 
meetings; Cash ﬂows is the ratio between the operating cash ﬂows and the total assets; Leverage represents the ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total assets; 
Net Operating Assets represents the net operating assets relative to sales; Performance is the ﬁrm’s performance; Investment opportunities represents the ratio between the market 
value of equity and the book value of equity; Firm size represents the ﬁrm’s size; Concentration represents the proportion of stocks owned by shareholders who own at least 2% of 
the common stock.
*** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); ** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 1 shows that DACC variables have a mean and median value of -0.052 and -0.056 
respectively. About 17% of companies attributed stock options during the period 2003 to 
2010. Board size is comprised of approximately 8 members (with a median of 7 members). 
About 30% (with a median of 28.3%) of the board members are independent non-executive 
directors, with a minimum of 0.0% and a maximum of 59.2%. In about 41.8% of companies 
there is a separation of the functions of the CEO and chairman. On average, the board meets 
about 21 times a year. Cash ﬂows variable represents on average 7.1 of the total assets of the 
company (with a median of 7.7). Leverage variable represents on average 4.406 of the total 
assets of the company (with a median of 1.985). The mean (median) level of Net operating 
assets is 1.762 (1.073). The mean and the median to Performance variable is -0.012 e 0.018, 
respectively, with a minimum of -1.662 and a maximum of 0.461. The descriptive statistics 
of the market-to-book ratio show that, on average, ﬁrms in our sample exhibit relatively high 
investment opportunities level with a mean (median) of 1.060 (0.994). The mean of ﬁrm size 
is about EUR 1.260 million with a minimum of EUR 1.881 thousand and a maximum of EUR 
16.345 million. The Concentration variable shows that, on average, that listed companies in 
Euronext Lisbon display a large degree of ownership concentration. About 72% of the ﬁrms 
use IFRS. 
The analysis of Table 2 shows that there are some signiﬁcant correlations between the variables. 
The binaries variables (stock options and IFRS) are not included in the Table 2, given that 
the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient is not computed to nominal variables. Some signiﬁcant 
correlations between the variables are identiﬁed. For instance, there is a signiﬁcant negative 
correlation between ﬁrm size and leverage, which suggests that larger ﬁrms have lower levels 
of leverage. There are also some signiﬁcant positive correlation between ﬁrm size and board 
size, ﬁrm size and meeting, as well between ﬁrm size and noduality, suggesting that larger ﬁrms 
have a higher number of directors on the board, higher incidence of CEO nonduality and more 
board meetings. There is also a signiﬁcant positive correlation between noduality and board 
size, suggesting that ﬁrms with separate chairman tend to have larger boards. Correlation 
coefﬁcients are, in general, low suggesting the absence of serious statistical problems related 
with multicollinearity (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Table 3 presents OLS regression estimates for the equation 3 developed in section three. 
5
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TABLE 3. OLS REGRESSIONS RESULTS
(number of observations: 264; Period: 2003-2010)
Dependent variable DACC_ JonesModel 
DACC_ ModJones
Model 
Independent variables Coef. t test Coef. t test
Constant 1.303 5.305*** 1.338 5.371***
Stock options 1.399 2.200** 1.404 2.212**
Board size -0.401 -2.645** -0.401 -2.651**
Independent board 0.015 1.136 0.018 1.143
Meetings -0.565 -2.423** -0.579 -2.450**
Nonduality 0.136 0.910 0.142 0.921
Cash ﬂows -0.047 -2.002** -0.052 -2.010**
Leverage 0.004 2.187** 0.004 2.199**
Net operating assets -0.395 -2.694** -0.398 -2.798**
Performance -0.006 -0.179 -0.006 -0.183
Investment opportunities 0.438 9.176*** 0.448 9.199***
Firm Size 0.410 9.091*** 0.420 9.165***
Firm Size2 0.038 2.091** 0.039 2.144**
Concentration -0.029 -1.065 -0.031 -1.108
IFRS -0.159 -0.990 -0.157 0.964
R-squared  37.37%  37.41%
Adjusted R-squared  33.60%  33.65%
F-statistic  9.914***  9.934***
DACC represents discretionary accruals estimated from the original Jones (1991) and modiﬁed Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) 
models; Stock options dummy variable which takes a value 1 if the managers of ﬁrm i hold stock options for period t, and 0 
otherwise; Board size is the number of members of the board; Independent board represents the ratio between the number of 
independent directors and the total number of board members; Nonduality dummy variable which takes a value 1 when ﬁrm’s 
CEO and board chair is not the same person and 0 otherwise; Meetings represents the annual number of board meetings; Cash 
ﬂows is the ratio between the operating cash ﬂows and the total assets; Leverage represents the ratio between the book value 
of all liabilities and the total assets; Net Operating Assets represents the net operating assets relative to sales; Performance is 
the ﬁrm’s performance; Investment opportunities represents the ratio between the market value of equity and the book value 
of equity; Firm size represents the ﬁrm’s size; Concentration represents the proportion of stocks owned by shareholders who 
own at least 2% of the common stock; IFRS dummy variable which takes a value 1 if the ﬁrm uses IFRS, and 0 otherwise.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level; * Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level. 
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Table 3 reports the results from equation (3) which examines the effects of stock options on 
CEO earnings management behaviours. Results suggest that stock options are signiﬁcantly 
positively related to earnings management, suggesting that managers are more likely to engage 
in earnings management when they hold stock options. As a result, executive stock options 
appear to have a negative effect on the quality of reported earnings. 
This result is consistent with some ﬁndings in the US (e.g. Baker, Collins and Reitenga, 2003; 
Balsam, Chen and Sankaraguruswamy, 2003; Cheng and Warﬁeld, 2005; Bergstresser and 
Philippon, 2006; Zhang et al., 2008) and UK (e.g. Kuang, 2008), who also report that stock 
options induce opportunistic managerial behaviour. Thus, like in countries characterized 
by dispersed ownership and well-developed capital markets, the use of stock options in 
Portugal seem also create incentive for managers to manipulate earnings. Consequently, an 
information asymmetry problem is created by offering unreliable and irrelevant ﬁnancial 
statements. 
Regarding the other variables, included as control variables, we ﬁnd, in both models, as in 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998), Ebrahim (2007) and Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003), 
a negative relationship between Board size and earnings management, which suggesting 
that board size is effective in deterring managers’ opportunistic earnings management. 
The Meetings is signiﬁcantly negatively related to earnings management, which suggests 
that board meeting frequency play an important role in constraining earnings management, 
conﬁrming the ﬁndings of Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003). As in Chen, Elder and Hsieh 
(2007), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Yang, Lai and Tan (2008), we document, 
in both models, a negative relationship between the Cash ﬂow and discretionary accruals. 
This result is consistent with the idea that Cash ﬂow has a systematic inverse relationship 
with accruals (Peasnell, Pope and Young, 2000). Leverage is signiﬁcantly positive, in both 
models, providing evidence that an increase in leverage encourage managers to use more 
accruals to manage earnings to avoid debt covenant violation, conﬁrming the prediction and 
results of DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Jiang, Lee and Anandarajan (2008). We ﬁnd a 
negative relationship between Net operating assets and earnings management, suggesting that 
high level of net operating results are associated with lower levels of discretionary accruals, 
conﬁrming the prediction and results of Barton and Simko (2002). Consistent with the ﬁndings 
of AlNajjar and Belkaoui (2001), Park and Shin (2004) and Chen, Cheng and Wang (2010), 
we also ﬁnd, in both models, that ﬁrms with higher investment opportunities are more likely to 
engage in earnings management. Finally, as in Chen, Elder and Hsieh (2007), Chung, Firth 
and Kim (2002) and Yang, Lai and Tan (2008), we ﬁnd that large ﬁrms have a higher level 
of earnings management, suggesting that larger ﬁrms are better able to manage accounting 
information and hide real performance. As in Sloan (1996), Firm size2 is also statistically 
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positive. Thus, the observed impact of the stock options on earnings management is unlikely 
to be a size effect.
Results suggest no evidence that independent board, nonduality, performance, concentration 
and IFRS affect the levels of earnings management. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
To ensure the robustness of our results, we perform several sensitivity checks. The ﬁrst 
sensitivity analysis examines the effects of interaction between stock options and leverage 
on discretionary accruals. Both stock options and leverage are a part of the overall corporate 
governance structure of the ﬁrm; consequently, it is unlikely that they operate independently 
within the corporate structure. Consequently, it is likely that both monitoring mechanisms 
operate jointly to mitigate earnings management. The results in Table 4 show that stock options 
and leverage jointly reduce earnings management. The other results remain unchanged (at 
coefﬁcient signal and signiﬁcant level).
We treat stock options as a predetermined variable in the regression reported in Table 3, 
whereas it could be argued to be endogenous. In fact, the stock options are likely to be an 
endogeneous variable because both earnings management and stock options are managerial 
decisions based on ﬁrm characteristics. This raises the possibility that our single equation 
ﬁndings may be the result of speciﬁcation bias. In supplementary tests, we employ a two-stage 
least squares procedure to endogenise stock options. The results obtained, in Table 5, using 
this simultaneous equation speciﬁcation has implications on ﬁrm size variable, which the 
relationship with earnings management becomes negative. The other results remain unchanged 
(at coefﬁcient signal and signiﬁcant level).
The above analyses indicate that the results of this paper are robust after controlling the 
effect of interaction between stock options and leverage on discretionary accruals, as well the 
potential endogeneity problem.
6
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TABLE 4. OLS REGRESSIONS RESULTS
Number of observations: 264; Period: 2003-2010
Dependent variable
DACC_ Jones
Model 
DACC_ ModJones
Model 
Independent variables Coef. t test Coef. t test
Constant 1.301 5.302*** 1.335 5.369***
Stock options 1.389 2.199** 1.400 2.209**
Board size -0.400 -2.641** -0.399 -2.647**
Independent board 0.014 1.134 0.016 1.140
Meetings -0.555 -2.421** -0.571 -2.446**
Nonduality 0.134 0.908 0.140 0.920
Cash ﬂows -0.045 -2.001** -0.051 -2.010**
Leverage 0.004 2.184** 0.004 2.193**
Net operating assets -0.393 -2.691** -0.397 -2.794**
Performance -0.005 -0.177 -0.006 -0.181
Investment opportunities 0.431 9.166*** 0.442 9.196***
Firm Size 0.408 9.088*** 0.418 9.164***
Firm Size2 0.038 2.090** 0.036 2.141**
Concentration -0.025 -1.062 -0.030 -1.105
IFRS -0.157 -0.990 -0.158 0.966
Stock options*Leverage -0.127 -5.655*** -0.130 -5.672***
R-squared  37.57%  37.61%
Adjusted R-squared  33.70%  33.75%
F-statistic  9.934***  9.944***
DACC represents discretionary accruals estimated from the original Jones (1991) and modiﬁed Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) 
models; Stock options dummy variable which takes a value 1 if the managers of ﬁrm i hold stock options for period t, and 0 
otherwise; Board size is the number of members of the board; Independent board represents the ratio between the number 
of independent directors and the total number of board members; Nonduality dummy variable which takes a value 1 when 
ﬁrm’s CEO and board chair is not the same person and 0 otherwise; Meetings represents the annual number of board 
meetings; Cash ﬂows is the ratio between the operating cash ﬂows and the total assets; Leverage represents the ratio between 
the book value of all liabilities and the total assets; Net Operating Assets represents the net operating assets relative to sales; 
Performance is the ﬁrm’s performance; Investment opportunities represents the ratio between the market value of equity and 
the book value of equity; Firm size represents the ﬁrm’s size; Concentration represents the proportion of stocks owned by 
shareholders who own at least 2% of the common stock; IFRS dummy variable which takes a value 1 if the ﬁrm uses IFRS, 
and 0 otherwise; Stock options*Leverage interaction between stock options and leverage.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level; * Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level. 
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TABLE 5. 2SLS REGRESSIONS RESULTS
Number of observations: 264; Period: 2003-2010
Dependent variable
DACC_ Jones
Model 
DACC_ ModJones
Model 
Independent variables Coef. t test Coef. t test
Constant 1.785 3.742*** 1.797 3.807***
Stock options_
2SLS 
1.259 2.091** 1.355 2.208**
Board size -0.314 -2.386*** -0.354 -2.545**
Independent board 0.012 1.106 0.025 1.506
Meetings -0.312 -2.485** -0.400 -2.643**
Nonduality 0.145 0.935 0.155 0.986
Cash ﬂows -0.051 -2.009* -0.065 -2.101**
Leverage 0.003 2.173* 0.006 2.249**
Net operating assets -0.312 -2.485** -0.385 -2.653**
Performance -0.012 -0.336 -0.014 -0.479
Investment opportunities 0.429 8.166*** 0.427 9.107***
Firm Size -0.506 -2.398** -0.598 -2.407**
Firm Size2 -0.192 -1.891* -0.199 -1.909*
Concentration -0.030 -1.065 -0.036 -1.084
IFRS -0.109 -0.790 -0.112 -0.801
R-squared  36.10%  37.58%
Adjusted R-squared  32.56%  32.97%
F-statistic  10.217***  10.381***
DACC represents discretionary accruals estimated from the original Jones (1991) and modiﬁed Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) 
models; Stock options_
2SLS
 instrumental variable; Board size is the number of members of the board; Independent board 
represents the ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of board members; Nonduality 
dummy variable which takes a value 1 when ﬁrm’s CEO and board chair is not the same person and 0 otherwise; Meetings 
represents the annual number of board meetings; Cash ﬂows is the ratio between the operating cash ﬂows and the total assets; 
Leverage represents the ratio between the book value of all liabilities and the total assets; Net Operating Assets represents 
the net operating assets relative to sales; Performance is the ﬁrm’s performance; Investment opportunities represents the 
ratio between the market value of equity and the book value of equity; Firm size represents the ﬁrm’s size; Concentration 
represents the proportion of stocks owned by shareholders who own at least 2% of the common stock; IFRS dummy variable 
which takes a value 1 if the ﬁrm uses IFRS, and 0 otherwise.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level; * Signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Theoretically, executive stock options align managers’ and shareholders’ interests. 
However, previous studies have indicated that stock options may engender manager-shareholder 
conﬂicts (Jensen, 2005) and create incentives for earnings management (e.g. Jensen, Murphy 
and Wruck, 2004; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson, 2007).
Therefore, this paper examines whether stock options motivate managers to engage in earnings 
management, within the Portuguese capital market. Using a sample of 33 non-ﬁnancial listed 
Portuguese ﬁrms-year from 2003 to 2010, we ﬁnd that managers are more likely to engage 
in earnings management when they hold stock options. The empirical ﬁndings suggest that 
the earnings management practices of Portuguese listed ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by these ﬁrms’ 
compensation structure. Speciﬁcally, our study shows that executive stock options increase the 
scope of managerial opportunism. Therefore, our ﬁndings indicate that executive stock options 
affect the informational quality of earnings negatively, and consequently reduce the quality 
and value relevance of published ﬁnancial data.
Moreover, the results also reveal that there is less earnings management when board size, 
board meeting frequency, operating cash ﬂows and net operating assets are high and that there 
is more earnings management when leverage, investment opportunities and ﬁrm size are high. 
The ﬁndings of this study make the following contributions. First, the results indicate that, on 
average, executive stock options do not provide effective monitoring of earnings management in 
Portuguese listed ﬁrms. Second, this study suggests that it is important for Portuguese listed ﬁrms 
to design appropriate performance-contingent compensation plans that balance the advantages 
of incentives with the disadvantages of excessive self-serving inclinations. Third, the ﬁndings 
are relevant for countries with an institutional environment (mainly concentrated ownership) 
similar to that of Portugal. Finally, investors may also beneﬁt from the ﬁndings because they 
provide insight into the impact of CEO compensation structure on earnings quality.
This study has, however, some limitations. First, the reduced number of observations may 
inﬂuence some results. Nevertheless, this limitation is an immediate consequence of the 
small size of the Portuguese stock market. Second, we compute discretionary accruals using 
both the Jones model (1991) and the modiﬁed Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 
1995). Although the models are accepted in accounting research, nevertheless, the accuracy 
of measurement of discretionary accruals will depend on how accurately the models can 
segregate discretionary accruals from total accruals. Third, the use of a binary variable to 
measure stock options, and thus its impact on earnings management, may also inﬂuence the 
7
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results. Actually, with this measure is not considered that the impact of the stock options on 
earnings management may depend on the value. Indeed, O’Connor et al. (2006) and Zhang et 
al. (2008) demonstrate that out-of-the-money and in-the-money options have different impacts 
on earnings management. Finally, the selection of the potential incentives can lead to the 
omission of some important incentives for earnings management. This mis-speciﬁcation can 
generate biased and inconsistent estimates. Actually, other factors can inﬂuence the earnings 
management, such as ownership structure (Ali, Salleh and Hassan, 2008) and the managerial 
compensation structure (in addition to stock options) (Guidry, Leone and Rock, 1999; Healy, 
1985; Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan, 1995). 
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